(f) Damages for Charter breaches where the conduct is serious
“promote good governance. Compliance with Charter
standards is a foundational principle of good governance” (at
(g) The quantum of Charter damages should not be unduly
high (partly in recognition of the fact that it is society as a
whole that is asked to pay), but the award “must represent
a meaningful response to the seriousness of the breach and
the objectives of compensation, upholding Charter values,
and deterring future breaches” (at para. 54).
 The trial judge’s reasons do not contain a discussion of
these principles. Most importantly, in deciding to deal with the
objectives of deterrence and vindication through punitive damages, the trial judge failed to sufficiently recognize that Charter
damages are awarded against the state, not the individual tortfeasor for whose actions the state may or may not be vicariously
liable. He also failed to recognize the important public objectives
of Charter damages, which are different from the objectives of
punitive damages that may be awarded against a private individual. As Ward makes clear, deterrence and vindication in the
public law context are different from deterrence and vindication
in the private law context. It is the state, not the individual, that
must be deterred; and it is society’s, not the claimant’s, rights
that must be vindicated.
 While this reason would be a sufficient basis to set aside
the trial judge’s award of Charter damages, the fact that the
trial judge failed to recognize that the appellant’s right to be free
from discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter was also violated
provides an additional basis for doing so.
 Under s. 134(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. C.43, a court to which an appeal is taken may, unless otherwise provided, “make any order or decision that ought to or
could have been made by the court or tribunal appealed from”
and/or “make any other order or decision that is considered just”.
Case law has recognized that where an appeal court sets aside
an award of damages, if it is in the interests of justice for the
court to reassess the amount of damages based on the record
before it, the court should do so rather than sending the issue
back to the trial judge (see Pirani v. Esmail,  O.J. No. 877,
2014 ONCA 145, 320 O.A.C. 356, at para. 89). In this case, it is
in the interests of justice that this court set the quantum of
damages based on the findings of the trial judge and the finding
of this court that the appellant was the victim of racial profiling.