At first blush, this argument of Trisura is compelling. However, I reject the argument because of the purpose and nature of a
solicitor’s charging order. As stated by Perell J. in Thomas Gold
Pettingill LLP, a solicitor’s charging order encompasses a statutory order and a charging lien, a declaratory order under the
common law and law of equity. The charging lien aspect of a charging order, I find, takes it out of the explicit wording of the PPSA.
 I agree with the submission of Trisura that the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that the words of the
Act are to be read in their entire context and given their ordinary
and grammatical meaning harmoniously with the content of the
Act.14 Thus, in looking at the content of the PPSA, Trisura argues,
if the legislator wished to have solicitors’ charging orders excluded
from the PPSA, it would have explicitly stated such. Trisura takes
the position that since charging orders is not in s. 4(1) of the
PPSA, the legislature did not explicitly exclude solicitors’ charging
orders from the application of the PPSA.
 However, in my opinion, the opposite is correct. If the legislature intended to interfere with the common law, law of equity
or statutory right of a solicitor’s charging order, it would have
provided explicit language that it intended to do so.15 Absent
such explicit language, it is presumed that the legislature did
not intend to interfere with the common law, law of equity or
statutory right to solicitors’ charging orders.16
 The ordinary wording of the PPSA gives different consequences to liens and charging orders. The wording is contradictory in that liens are excluded under s. 4(1) of the PPSA but
charging orders are not. This contradictory wording makes it
difficult to ascertain the intention of the legislature that, specifically, solicitors’ charging orders, encompassing a lien component
and statutory charging order component, are subject to a perfected security under the PPSA. It does not make logical sense to
me that the legislature intended that the statutory charging
order component of solicitors’ charging orders is subject to the
provisions of the PPSA but the lien component of a charging
order is not. It seems to me that this could lead to an unjust and
inequitable result, where one element being the lien component
14 Champion Feed Services Ltd. v. Hospers,  A.J. No. 914, 2014 ABQB
490, at para. 8; and Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada,  3 S.C.R.
166,  S.C.J. No. 60, 2008 SCC 58, at para. 16.
15 Hamilton (City) v. Equitable Trust Co. (2013), 114 O.R. (3d) 602, 
O.J. No. 1036, 2013 ONCA 143, at para. 34.