paying for the services rendered to recover and preserve the
funds paid into court. It is undisputed that Trisura did not incur
legal costs to defend the construction lien actions or prosecute
Unimac’s construction lien action against the owners.
 I do not accept this argument of Trisura for various reasons. First, I do not accept that Trisura can lay in the weeds, do
nothing, have the funds posted in court recovered and preserved,
and then rely on terms of the indemnity agreement to oust any
payment for the preservation and recovery of these funds that
may have occurred through the efforts of BPR. Trisura was aware
of the multitude of actions that were being defended by Unimac
and the lien action prosecuted by Unimac against the owner.
 Trisura was aware that the funds posted into court by the
owners, trustees of the Mount Albert United Church Congregation of the United Church of Canada, Mount Albert, Ontario, was
transferred to Unimac to resolve Unimac’s lien action against the
owners. Trisura is further deemed to know that the funds posted
into court for the benefit of Unimac, recovered and preserved by
Unimac, is subject to “the deduction of the costs to be paid to the
solicitor who has conducted the litigation which is successful”.
 This court did acknowledge that para. 15(b) of the indemnity agreement did assign and transfer “as collateral, all right,
title and interest of the Indemnitors to every contract, retained
percentages, holdbacks, progress payments, deferred payments,
earned moneys, compensation for extra work, proceeds’ of damage claims”.24 Further, Unimac’s interest in the bonds posted
into court has been transferred or assigned to Trisura, if the
indemnity agreement is upheld as legally valid and enforceable.25 However, this does not translate to the conclusion that the
posted bonds are not subject to a deduction for reasonable fees
and disbursements rendered by a solicitor to recover and preserve said posted funds. Trisura takes any legally valid assignment subject to the inchoate rights of the solicitor to a charging
order, in my opinion. To decide otherwise would be contrary to
the purpose of solicitors’ charging orders.
 Thus, I find if BPR can satisfy this court that it qualifies
for a solicitor’s charging order and the court assesses the reasonable fees and disbursements incurred by BPR, such assessed
amount of the charging order is a deduction of the costs to be
paid to BPR who, if the court finds, conducted litigation which is
successful in recovering and preserving property of Unimac.
24 Dalcor Inc., supra, note 2, at paras. 32-33.
25 This is one of the issues to be adjudicated in the Toronto action.