(a) for services or activities provided or done by or on behalf of it;
(b) for costs payable by it for services or activities provided or done by
or on behalf of any other municipality or any local board; and
(c) for the use of its property including property under its control.
 Nylene argues that s. 394(1)(c) of the Act prevents Arnprior from charging it more for wastewater services than the
amount it actually discharges. Nylene discharges approximately
89 per cent of the quantity of water it receives each month into
the wastewater system.
 Section 394(1) reads as follows:
394(1) No fee or charge by-law shall impose a fee or charge that is based
on, is in respect of or is computed by reference to,
(a) the income of a person, however it is earned or received, except
that a municipality or local board may exempt, in whole or in part,
any class of persons from all or part of a fee or charge on the basis
of inability to pay;
(b) the use, purchase or consumption by a person of property other than
property belonging to or under the control of the municipality or
local board that passes the by-law;
(c) the use, consumption or purchase by a person of a service other
than a service provided or performed by or on behalf of or paid for
by the municipality or local board that passes the by-law;
(d) the benefit received by a person from a service other than a ser-
vice provided or performed by or on behalf of or paid for by the
municipality or local board that passes the by-law; or
(e) the generation, exploitation, extraction, harvesting, processing,
renewal or transportation of natural resources.
 In the decision of Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) (1998),
36 O.R. (3d) 418,  1 S.C.R. 27,  S.C.J. No. 2, at para.
21, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted Elmer Driedger’s
approach to statutory interpretation, which is as follows:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act
are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary
sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the
intention of Parliament.
Summary judgment test
 In Hryniak v. Mauldin,  1 S.C.R. 87,  S.C.J.
No. 7, 2014 SCC 7, the Supreme Court held that summary
judgment motions must be granted whenever there is no genuine
issue requiring a trial. There will be no genuine issue requiring