O.J. No. 460, 2008 ONCA 91), the Crown at trial requested
a penitentiary sentence. The trial judge was not persuaded that
the “significant sexual assault” committed by the appellant was
as serious as the misconduct in those cases. He said that (at para.
37), “had there been a fully completed act of vaginal or anal intercourse with the complainant” in the face of her saying “No, no,
no”, then three years’ imprisonment would have been “entirely
appropriate”. However, given that there was only partial penetration, and in light of the activity that preceded the assault, the
case was [at para. 39] “somewhat less serious than the assaults
in the cases referred to by the Crown”.
 The mitigating value attributed to these offence features
( i.e., partial penetration and prior “consensual” behaviour) is
doubtful, especially when the assault only came to an end when
someone knocked on the bathroom door. Having expressed a different view in his reasons for judgment ( i.e., the appellant did
not stop because the complainant said “no”), in his reasons for
sentence the trial judge said, at para. 10, “I am not certain the
encounter would have continued if that knocking had not
occurred.” I mention these aspects of the trial judge’s reasons
to demonstrate that every possible benefit was extended to the
appellant in terms of the manner in which his offending was
 Ultimately, it must be determined whether the sentence
imposed upon the appellant was “demonstrably unfit”: see R. v.
Lacasse,  3 S.C.R. 1089,  S.C.J. No. 64, 2015 SCC
64, at paras. 51 to 53. The sexual offence was serious, one involving anal penetration, which is generally treated as an aggravating circumstance: see R. v. R. (M.),  O.J. No. 2971, 2014
ONCA 484, 114 W.C.B. (2d) 471, at para. 6. Given the superficial
relationship between the appellant and the complainant, their
age difference, the complainant’s alcohol consumption, the circumstances in which the sexual assault took place and the impact
on the complainant, the trial judge was right to characterize this
sexual assault as “significant”. Leaving aside immigration consequences for the moment, which I will return to below, many
aspects of the appellant’s background and life circumstances
were positive, and the trial judge did take them into account.
However, these had to be balanced against the appellant’s troubling lack of insight into his own behaviour, and the harm he
caused the complainant.
 Every case is unique. Despite the existence of sentencing
ranges for particular types of offending, “[t]he determination of a
just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise
that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation”: see Lacasse,