Returning to the immigration context, in his earlier decision in Pham, Wagner J. warned (at para. 16) that the consideration of immigration consequences “must not lead to a separate
sentencing scheme with a de facto if not a de jure special range
of sentencing options where deportation is a risk”. The appellant’s approach risks doing just that.
 Finally, I am not persuaded that the competing approaches
to addressing immigration consequences will make any difference at the end of the day. What is important is that, whatever
mode of analysis is utilized, sentencing judges give the issue
serious consideration in determining a fit sentence.
 Returning to the facts of this case, the trial judge did give
serious consideration to the appellant’s immigration situation.
He thoroughly considered the issue and, after “anxious consideration”, concluded that it would not be appropriate to impose a
sentence of imprisonment that was less than six months. Indeed,
he could find no jurisprudential support for such a lenient sentence in the circumstances of this case, nor could counsel on
appeal point us to any authority. To have imposed a sentence of
less than six months’ imprisonment would have involved reducing the sentence solely for the purpose of avoiding the impact of
the IRPA, something that the court in Pham, para. 15, held
inappropriate. See, also, R. v. Badhwar,  O.J. No. 1541,
2011 ONCA 266, 270 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at paras. 42 to 45; R. v.
Freckleton,  O.J. No. 777, 2016 ONCA 130, 128 W.C.B. (2d)
434, at para. 2; and R. v. Mohammed,  O.J. No. 4717, 2016
ONCA 678, 132 W.C.B. (2d) 383, at para. 3. It would have
resulted in a demonstrably unfit sentence for a “significant sexual assault” involving anal penetration.
 While I would grant leave to appeal sentence, I would
dismiss the appeal.