the presumption would not undermine the prosecution of the
child luring offence.
 Furthermore, it is important to note that, if the record
discloses any evidence suggesting that the accused did not
believe that the interlocutor was underage, or if there is some
evidence that he or she took reasonable steps to ascertain the
interlocutor’s age, the Crown cannot rely on the presumption of
belief, and it must prove that the accused failed to take those
steps beyond a reasonable doubt. I am not persuaded that the
presumption actually facilitates the conviction of child luring
offences by increasing the number of convictions that would
ordinarily occur without resort to the presumption or that there
is a problem with unjustified acquittals.
 As a result, I am also not persuaded that the salutary
effects of limiting s. 11(d) of the Charter by means of the presumption of belief in s. 172.1(3) of the Code outweigh the deleterious effects of this limitation. The presumption of innocence
protected by s. 11(d) of the Charter is, after all, “a hallowed principle lying at the very heart of criminal law” that “confirms our
faith in humankind” and “reflects our belief that individuals are
decent and law-abiding members of the community until proven
otherwise”: Oakes, at pp. 119-20 S.C.R.
 I conclude that the Crown has not established on a balance of probabilities that the infringement of s. 11(d) of the
Charter imposed by s. 172.1(3) of the Code is demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
 Section 172.1(3) of the Code is therefore of no force of
effect pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
 In the present case, Morrison was not convicted by means
of the presumption of belief in s. 172.1(3). Because the trial
judge held that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Morrison failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain
“Mia’s” age, Morrison’s conviction stands or falls with the constitutionality of the reasonable steps requirement under s. 172.1(4)
of the Code. I will now consider his challenge to this provision
under s. 7 of the Charter.
(d) Does the “reasonable steps” requirement infringe
s. 7 of the Charter?
 Section 7 of the Charter provides:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of