burden of proving certain necessary elements of his claim,
namely, that the abuse had occurred at the Spanish Boys IRS
before it closed, or that it arose from or was connected with the
operation of the school.
 The re-review adjudicator fully considered M.F.’s argument that the adjudicator had made improper use of her extra-curial knowledge in relation to the age at which boys are confirmed in the Catholic Church. After a thorough review of the
record, the re-review adjudicator concluded that the adjudicator’s decision could be supported without reference to her extra-curial knowledge. That conclusion was, in my view, supportable.
As I have already explained, there was considerable evidence
beyond this extra-curial knowledge from which a fact-finder
could reasonably conclude that M.F. had failed to establish the
necessary elements of his claim as an IRS non-resident. While
I understand that the administrative judge did not agree with
that conclusion, the re-review adjudicator’s decision was not so
unreasonable or exceptionally wrong that it amounted to a failure to enforce the IRSSA or apply the IAP model.
 The administrative judge appears to have taken the view
that if, in his judgment, M.F. was entitled to compensation, any
other conclusion necessarily reflected a failure to apply the IAP
model. In my respectful opinion, that approach reflects a failure
to follow the strictures imposed in Schachter on recourse to the
courts from IAP decisions, and one that, if accepted, could significantly undermine the finality and integrity of the IAP.
Newly discovered evidence
 As Canada is prepared to consent to an order remitting
M.F.’s claim to the chief adjudicator for reconsideration in the
light of the newly discovered documents, it is not necessary for
me to consider whether, in the circumstances of this case, the
newly discovered evidence would amount to an exceptional circumstance that would allow for judicial recourse.
 It follows from what I have said about the limited jurisdiction of the administrative judge that he erred by making his
own determination of M.F.’s claim rather than remitting it to the
chief adjudicator for re-consideration. Nor can his decision to
depart from the IAP model for determining the appropriate level
of compensation and costs be supported. The determination of
harm and level of compensation requires the specialized
knowledge and experience of an IAP adjudicator. The compensation rules include an intricate points system. The category of