harm the administrative judge selected requires a medical
assessment, and none had been provided. The IAP also requires
reasons for the assessment of harm and, as noted, the administrative judge gave none, as the specified level of harm first
appeared in the order he signed. He was, in my view, not entitled to depart from the IAP to establish an alternate framework
whereby he could delegate responsibility to determine compensation or fees to other judicial officers.
 I have no doubt that the administrative judge was motivated by a genuine and sincere desire to see that justice was done
in this particular case, and to ensure that M.F. received compensation without further delay. Doing justice, however, involves
more than going straight to what the judge thinks is the right
result. Justice requires that procedural rules and jurisdictional
boundaries designed to protect the rights of all parties be
respected. The IRSSA provides that claims for compensation are
to be resolved not by courts, but by trained and specialized adjudicators operating under the carefully designed IAP model. In my
view, justice in this case can more fully and completely be
achieved for all parties by respecting the IAP, following the law as
laid down in Schacher, and remitting M.F.’s claim for proper
reconsideration by the chief adjudicator under the terms of the
IAP, in accordance with the agreement of all parties to the IRSSA.
Roles of the review and re-review adjudicators
 For the sake of completeness and to clarify matters for
future cases, I add that, in my view, the administrative judge
erred in his interpretation of the IAP review and re-review
model. For convenience, I repeat here the relevant provisions:
( i) For cases within the standard or complex track, any party may ask the
Chief Adjudicator or designate to determine whether an adjudicator’s,
or reviewing adjudicator’s, decision properly applied the IAP Model to
the facts as found by the adjudicator, and if not, to correct the decision,
and the Chief Adjudicator or designate may do so.
( ii) In both the standard and the complex issues tracks, Claimants may
require that a second adjudicator review a decision to determine
whether it contains a palpable and overriding error.
( iii) . . .
( iv) If a palpable and overriding error is found, the reviewing adjudicator
may substitute their own decision or order a new hearing.
 I disagree with the administrative judge that these provisions contemplate two levels of review of factual findings on the
palpable and overriding error standard. The provisions make a
distinction between review on the ground that the adjudicator