the use of a percentage. I note that there are separate provisions
within the Solicitors Act, that deal with contingency agreements,
that were added in 2002.
 Dambrot J. found that the other references in s. 16(1)
( i.e., gross sum, commission, percentage) describe unusual or
extraordinary fee arrangements. He concluded, as a result, that
s. 16(1) only applies to written fee agreements that are “out of
the ordinary”. I agree with that conclusion. In doing so, however,
I recognize that the use of the words “or otherwise”, in s. 16(1),
could be seen to be broad enough to expand the coverage of the
section to all written fee agreements. Two things argue against
that conclusion, however. One is that the punctuation used in
the section clearly links “or otherwise” to salary, and not to the
other enumerated forms of payment. That fact suggests that the
words were not intended to sweep into the section all other
forms of written fee agreements. I would also make the salient
point that, if the legislature had intended to include all written
fee agreements within the scope of s. 16(1), it could have said so
in plain and simple terms.
 The other is the reality that, if that broad interpretation
is to be put on the section because of those words, the practical
effect of the interpretation leads to the functional equivalent of
an absurdity. In making that point, I am aware that there is
only one governing principle regarding the interpretation of a
statute, that is, that “the words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act,
and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re)
(1998), 36 O.R. (3d) 418,  1 S.C.R. 27,  S.C.J. No. 2,
per Iacobucci J., at para. 21.
 However, that governing principle does not require a
court to interpret a statute in a manner that defeats the purpose
of the statute or leads to an absurdity. This point is made in R. v.
Paul,  1 S.C.R. 621,  S.C.J. No. 32, where Lamer J.
quoted, with approval, the following principle from Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes:
Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical
construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of
the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly
have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the
meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be
done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning
to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that
the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and
that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and
really give the true meaning.