In considering whether an absurdity does result, context
is important in the interpretation exercise. Context includes the
practical realities that exist, and to which the purpose of the
statute is directed. As was observed in Bell ExpressVu Limited
Partnership v. Rex,  2 S.C.R. 559,  S.C.J. No. 43, by
Iacobucci J., at para. 27:
The preferred approach recognizes the important role that context must
inevitably play when a court construes the written words of a statute: as
Professor John Willis incisively noted in his seminal article “Statute Inter-
pretation in a Nutshell” (1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at p. 6, “words, like peo-
ple, take their colour from their surroundings”.
 I have already set out above the fact that the assessment
system cannot handle the demands that are currently made of
it, and the problems that would be created if every written fee
agreement, for contentious work, had to be reviewed, through
that system, before a lawyer could receive his/her fees. That
reality, and the consequential effects that would be visited on
the profession, and on the public, from such an interpretation
must be considered in the overall interpretative process. They
are part of the context.
 In reaching my conclusion, I am mindful of the fact that
the provisions, regarding a review of written fee agreements,
were originally enacted to ensure that clients were protected
from potentially agreeing to terms that were not fair or advantageous, at a time when they were especially vulnerable. However, interpreting s. 16(1) (and thus the other related provisions)
as applying only to unusual or extraordinary fee agreements,
does not eliminate the protections for clients who sign usual or
normal fee agreements.
 For one, clients still retain the right to have an account
assessed under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act, and the one-month prohibition on a lawyer commencing an action to recover payment
remains under s. 2, so that the client has that time to seek an
assessment. For another, the client retains the right, in any
action commenced to enforce a written fee agreement, to plead
all of the common law defences that might be applicable, such as
unconscionability, undue influence, non est factum and the like.
 Before concluding, I should mention one other authority,
and that is my own decision in Jane Conte Professional Corp. v.
Smith,  O.J. No. 5033, 2014 ONSC 6009 (Div. Ct.), since it
appears to have added to the confusion surrounding this issue.
 The decision in Jane Conte dealt with a contingency fee
agreement. As I have already pointed out, contingency fee
agreements enjoy their own special provisions within the
Solicitors Act. Thus, under the terms of the statute, such agreements