family law proceedings that must be tried without a jury pursuant to s. 108(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.
 The motion judge then noted that, on a motion under rule
21.01(1)(b), a statement of claim may be struck where, assuming
the facts pleaded are true, it is plain and obvious that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action. He acknowledged
that the standard is very low for the demonstration of a reasonable cause of action on a Rule 21 motion. However, he also cited
Frame v. Smith,  2 S.C.R. 99,  S.C.J. No. 49, at para.
36, for the proposition that in litigation involving children a
“more stringent standard” may be imposed in order to ensure
the children’s best interests are protected. The motion judge
stated that he would apply that “more stringent standard” to the
 The motion judge held [(2016), 129 O.R. (3d) 175] that the
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation could not be made out. He
determined that “PP is only suing in fraudulent misrepresentation because he had a non-pathological emotional shock from
becoming a parent” (para. 74). In the motion judge’s view, fraudulent misrepresentation is an economic or pecuniary loss tort,
for which damages are meant to restore a party to the financial
circumstances he or she was in prior to relying on the misrepresentation. As a result, it was plain and obvious that a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim for damages for what the motion judge
labelled as “non-pathological emotional harm resulting from an
unplanned parenthood” could not succeed.
 The motion judge took issue with PP’s allegation that his
consent to sexual activity was vitiated by fraud. The judge noted
that lack of consent is not a constituent element of a claim for
fraudulent misrepresentation. In his view, vitiated consent is the
effect and not the cause of a fraudulent misrepresentation.
 In addition, the motion judge held that PP should not be
allowed to extend the scope of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation to circumvent the legal boundaries of the torts of
intentional infliction of mental suffering or negligence. He identified those two torts as the “conventional legal tools” for civil
redress against misconduct causing emotional harm.
 With respect to negligence, the motion judge held that the
non-pathological emotional harm claimed by PP did not rise to
the level of compensable damage for personal injury: Mustapha
v. Culligan of Canada Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 114,  S.C.J. No.
27, 2008 SCC 27, at para. 9.
 Similarly, in the motion judge’s view, a claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering could not succeed, in part
because the constituent elements of that tort include damage in