LP (2013), 118 O.R. (3d) 113,  O.J. No. 5384, 2013 ONCA
657, at para. 94.
(2) The potential claim in battery
 I turn now to the appellant’s submission that, for the purpose of advancing a claim in battery, the misrepresentation of the
respondent vitiated the appellant’s consent to sexual intercourse.
 In Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s London v. Scalera,
 1 S.C.R. 551,  S.C.J. No. 26, 2000 SCC 24, McLach-
lin J. (as she then was), writing for the majority, set out the pur-
pose and features of the tort of battery, at para. 15:
The tort of battery is aimed at protecting the personal autonomy of the indi-
vidual. Its purpose is to recognize the right of each person to control his or
her body and who touches it, and to permit damages where this right is vio-
lated. The compensation stems from violation of the right to autonomy, not
fault. When a person interferes with the body of another, a prima facie case
of violation of the plaintiff’s autonomy is made out. The law may then fairly
call upon the person thus implicated to explain, if he can. If he can show
that he acted with consent, the prima facie violation is negated and the
plaintiff’s claim will fail.
 The constituent elements of the tort of “sexual battery”
are the same as those of the tort of battery. That is, the plaintiff
must prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendant
intentionally touched the plaintiff in a sexual manner. To prove
a battery, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the interference with his or her body was “harmful” or “offensive”, but this
element is implied (assuming a lack of consent) in the context
of a sexual battery: Scalera, at para. 22.
 An apparent consent to sexual touching will be invalid if
it has been obtained by duress, force or threat of force, given
under the influence of drugs, secured through deceit or fraud as
to the nature of the defendant’s conduct, or obtained from someone who was legally incapable of consenting or where an unequal power relationship is being exploited: Norberg v. Wynrib,
 2 S.C.R. 226,  S.C.J. No. 60, at pp. 246-47 S.C.R.
For the purpose of this appeal, I will focus only on fraud.
 In Linden and Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law (10th ed.)
(Toronto: LexisNexis, October 2015), the authors explain that
not all forms of fraud will undermine consent to sexual touching.
As they state, at p. 82, the key question is whether the deceit
goes to the “nature and quality of the act”. Consent to sexual
touching will normally remain operative if the deceit relates
not to the “nature and quality of the act”, but instead to some