and Feldthusen, insofar as fraud going to the “nature and quality of the act” will undermine consent. Where there is a deception or mistaken belief with respect to either the identity of the
sexual partner or the sexual nature of the act itself, no consent
to sexual touching will have been obtained: see Hutchinson,
at para. 57.
 In the present case, there is no issue as to whether there
was deception concerning the identity of the sexual partner or
the sexual nature of the act itself. The appellant concedes that
he consented to sexual intercourse with the respondent. His precise allegation is that his otherwise valid consent was vitiated in
the circumstances by fraud.
 This takes me to the second question in Hutchinson,
namely, what types of fraud will vitiate consent to sexual activity. Here the court confirmed the approach it took in the cases of
R. v. Cuerrier, supra, and R. v. Mabior,  2 S.C.R. 584,
 S.C.J. No. 47, 2012 SCC 47. That is, for consent to be
vitiated by fraud there must be (1) dishonesty, which can
include the non-disclosure of important facts; and (2) a deprivation or risk of deprivation in the form of serious bodily harm that
results from the dishonesty: Hutchinson, at para. 67.
 In Hutchinson, the accused punctured holes in a condom
that he then used to have intercourse with the complainant.
As a result, unbeknownst to the complainant the sex was unprotected and the intercourse gave rise to a significant risk of
serious bodily harm, namely, becoming pregnant with all of its
[ 81] The majority in Hutchinson considered that the presence
or absence of a condom during sexual intercourse does not
affect the “specific physical sex act” to which the complainant
consented, namely, sexual intercourse, but is rather a “collateral
condition” to that sexual activity. In the majority’s view, so long
as there is consent to “sexual intercourse”, this general consent
is not vitiated by dishonesty about condom use unless it exposes
the individual to a “deprivation or risk of deprivation in the form
of serious bodily harm which results from the dishonesty” (para.
67). On the facts of Hutchinson, the deprivation consisted
of denying the woman the benefit of choosing not to become
pregnant [at para. 71] “by making her pregnant, or exposing her
to an increased risk of becoming pregnant” and thereby exposing
her to a significant risk of serious bodily harm. This was based
on the majority’s understanding that “harm” includes at least
the sorts of profound changes in a woman’s body resulting from
pregnancy (paras. 69-72).