Following the sentencing judge’s decision that the whole
of Mr. Rafilovich’s equity in the property should be forfeited,
counsel for Mr. Rafilovich asked the sentencing judge to fix the
value of his equity in the property at $100,000 as of the date of
the sentencing hearing. If the property increased in value, he did
not want this to increase the amount to be forfeited. The Crown
did not oppose that request and indicated that he thought that
was about right, “in that neighbourhood for sure”.
 Mr. Rafilovich argues on appeal that the sentencing judge
should have inferred from the purchase price in 2004
($213,342.27), and an appraisal in 2012 ($325,000), that the property as a whole was worth $270,000 at the time of the restraint
order of Forestell J. in November 2008. He also suggested that the
indebtedness incurred to purchase the property in 2004, $25,000
for a line of credit and a mortgage of $156,030, were likely
reduced to $22,000 and $135,640.20 by the time of the restraint
order. He submits that the value of the equity as of the date of the
restraint order was $56,500, and that, in light of his maintenance
of the property and payment of the carrying expenses since the
restraint order, this lesser amount should be forfeited instead of
the $100,000 ordered by the trial judge. Mr. Rafilovich also rented
the property. The record does not permit a precise calculation of
his income and expenses related to the property.
 Given the agreement of all counsel as to the amount that
accurately reflects the impact of the sentencing judge’s forfeiture
order, there is no basis to interfere with the sentencing judge’s
 Section 19(3) of the CDSA provides for forfeiture of property following conviction. An order for forfeiture of property
implies the loss of property and sale by the Crown to realize the
value of the property. Section 16(1)(b) specifically provides that
the property is to be disposed of by a province or Canada.
 Here, the sentencing judge was asked to decide whether
the whole or part of Mr. Rafilovich’s interest in the property
should be forfeited. After she made that decision, both Crown
and defence counsel asked the sentencing judge to quantify the
amount that should be forfeited, and they agreed to the amount.
There is no basis to say that her decision that the whole of the
accused’s interest should be forfeited did not properly apply the
principles of proportionality required.
 Calculation of an amount that is proportionate to the
nature and gravity of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence and the criminal record, if any,
of the accused, all non-financial considerations, is not an exact
science. A sentencing judge is not to be expected to embark on