assaulted before the school closed. There was no evidence that
Father B. was employed by the girls school, the alternate theory
advanced by M.F. to explain how the abuse may have occurred in
connection with an IRS after the closure of the boys’ school. Even
if Father B. had given M.F. permission to be on the premises to
receive altar boy training, “given the probable time when this
training likely took place, it was likely after the school closed”.
 The adjudicator concluded that the abuse did not arise
from and was not connected to the operation of the Spanish
 M.F. takes issue with the following passage in the adjudicator’s reasons, in which she relied on extra-curial knowledge
regarding the age at which M.F. could have served as an altar boy:
It is my understanding that standard practice is that a boy cannot serve as
an altar boy until he is confirmed in the Catholic Church. Confirmation
usually takes place when a boy turns 8 years of age. If [M.F.] was confirmed
at age 8 (May, 1958), then he was confirmed in the year the Spanish Boys’
school closed that June. It is highly unlikely that in the time between his
8th birthday and the time the school closed, that he was able to be confirmed and trained to be an altar boy.
 The IAP allows adjudicators to use extra-curial knowledge
to make decisions, including background or personal knowledge
of the IRS system and the effects of child abuse. They may carry
forward information from hearing to hearing, such as information about the modus operandi of alleged perpetrators, conditions at a particular school or past credibility findings. However,
such extra-curial knowledge cannot be relied on “as an independent basis for their conclusions of fact”.
Review and re-review
 If a claimant is dissatisfied with the adjudicator’s decision, the IAP provides that he or she may ask for a review by
another adjudicator, and if dissatisfied with the review, for a further review, referred to by the parties as a “re-review”.
 The review and re-review of adjudicators’ decisions is gov-
erned by s. III( l), which provides as follows:
( i) For cases within the standard or complex track, any party may ask the
Chief Adjudicator or designate to determine whether an adjudicator’s,
or reviewing adjudicator’s, decision properly applied the IAP Model to
the facts as found by the adjudicator, and if not, to correct the decision,
and the Chief Adjudicator or designate may do so.
( ii) In both the standard and the complex issues tracks, Claimants may
require that a second adjudicator review a decision to determine
whether it contains a palpable and overriding error.
( iii) . . .