to conclude that M.F. had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was assaulted before the school closed”.
 The administrative judge implicitly exercised the error-correcting jurisdiction of an appellate court by identifying, at
para. 71, what he described as “an inconsistent, discordant, and
with respect, perverse finding of fact” regarding the timing of the
abuse alleged in M.F.’s claim. The adjudicator had found that M.F.
had been sexually assaulted and, in the administrative judge’s
view, there was no evidence indicating that the assault occurred
after the IRS closed. It was, therefore, a palpable and overriding
error for the adjudicator to conclude that M.F. had not met the
standard of proof for entitlement to IAP compensation, quite
apart from the impact of the newly discovered evidence. Once he
had identified that purported error, the administrative judge
assumed the role of a trier of fact, re-weighed the evidence and
concluded that M.F. was entitled to compensation.
 The administrative judge went on to hold that even if the
re-review adjudicator was only required to review the review
adjudicator’s decision, he erred in affirming that decision
because the review adjudicator failed to apply the IAP framework and correct the palpable and overriding error made by the
adjudicator: para. 72. Moreover, the review adjudicator did not
articulate the correct test for what constitutes a palpable and
overriding error. She relied on Dunsmuir to hold that she had to
defer to the adjudicator if the adjudicator’s decision was reasonable, but Dunsmuir “[is not] relevant to the exercise of a Review
Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to review decisions of Adjudicators”:
 The administrative judge rejected Canada’s position that
a rehearing of M.F.’s claim should be ordered. He agreed that
such a remedy was available but stated that the alternatives
would be to decide the IAP claim himself, or to appoint a referee
to decide the claim.
 The administrative judge held that, even without the
fresh evidence disclosed by Canada, “the decision as I have corrected it can only lead to one result”, that is, that M.F. was entitled to compensation: para. 80. Therefore, he did not send the
matter back to adjudication. Although the administrative judge
did not deal with the point in his reasons, his order made an
award to M.F. at a specified level of harm under the IAP grid,
despite the fact the IAP requires medical evidence to support
that level of compensation and no such evidence had been led.
The administrative judge also decided that he would quantify