[I]n the very limited circumstances where the final decision of the Chief
Adjudicator reflects a failure to comply with the terms of the [IRSSA] or the
implementation orders, the aggrieved party may apply to the Administrative Judges for directions. These limited circumstances would include where
the Chief Adjudicator upholds a decision of the Adjudicator as fair and reasonable even though the Adjudicator failed to consider the factors set out in
para. 18 of the implementation orders in arriving at his/her fee review decision in a specific case. By providing for recourse to an Administrative Judge
in these limited circumstances, the parties will be able to ensure that the
bargain to which they consented is respected.
. . . . .
[A] Request for Direction may only be brought where it is alleged that the
Chief Adjudicator’s decision reflects a failure to enforce the provisions of the
[IRSSA] and the implementation orders. This very limited availability of
a right to seek review of a Chief Adjudicator’s decision reflects both the
importance of the finality of decisions under the [IRSSA] and the relative
expertise of the Chief Adjudicator in the legal fee review process.
 I see no merit in M.F.’s argument that Schachter should
be read narrowly as applying only to legal fee determinations.
That argument was properly rejected in Fontaine v. Canada
(Attorney General),  B.C.J. No. 2603, 2016 BCSC 2218,
at para. 176. While Schachter involved a dispute concerning IAP
legal fees, the principles upon which the decision rests apply
with equal force to IAP compensation decisions. The IAP represents a comprehensive, tailor-made scheme for the resolution of
claims by trained and experienced adjudicators, selected according to specified criteria and working under the direction of the
chief adjudicator. Allowing appeals or judicial review to the
courts from IAP decisions is not contemplated by the IAP, the
IRSSA or the implementation orders. Allowing appeals or judicial review would seriously compromise the finality of the IAP
and fail to pay appropriate heed to the distinctive nature of the
IAP and the expertise of IAP adjudicators.
 I disagree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that
Schachter created a “general curial jurisdiction” in relation to
the IAP. This court did not use that phrase and the entire thrust
of the judgment is to the contrary. As Brown J. explained in
Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 2218, supra,
at para. 177, “the phrase ‘curial review’ suggests a right to seek
review before the Courts and a standard of review, both of which
are untenable” in the light of Schacher.
 Schachter imposed strict limits on the scope for judicial
intervention. It did so to respect the IRSSA, the contract the
parties negotiated, of which the IAP is a fundamental part.
As this court recognized in Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General) (2016), 130 O.R. (3d) 1,  O.J. No. 1658, 2016 ONCA
241, at para. 48, “[a]djudicators are specially trained to conduct