the hearing in a way that is respectful to the claimant and conducive to obtaining a full description of his or her experience”.
The IAP has been aptly described as “a complete code” that limits access to the courts, preserves the finality of the IAP process
and respects the expertise of IAP adjudicators: see Fontaine v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 2218, supra, at para. 178.
 Subsequent decisions confirm the limits imposed by
Schachter. In Fontaine Estate v. Canada (Attorney General),
 M.J. No. 232, 2016 MBQB 159, Edmond J. held that judicial recourse was limited to ensuring that the review adjudicator
did not endorse a legal interpretation that was so unreasonable
that it amounted to a failure to apply the IAP. In Fontaine v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 2218, supra, at para.
183, Brown J. held that judicial recourse was limited to situations where an IAP decision “reflects a patent disregard for the
IAP Model’s compensation rules, such as a failure to award compensation on the basis of the rubric it provides” or (at para. 211)
was “so exceptionally wrong in law as to amount to a failure to
apply the IAP Model”.
Did the administrative judge exceed the limits imposed by
 In my respectful view, the administrative judge failed to
respect the limits imposed by Schachter. His reasons reveal that
he undertook a full-blown appeal of the IAP decisions on both
law and fact. He engaged in a detailed review of the factual findings made by the adjudicator, and thereby assumed the role of
the review adjudicator. He was not entitled to assume a role the
IAP specifically assigns to the review adjudicator. The review
adjudicator had reviewed the evidence in some considerable
detail and explained why she found that the adjudicator made
no palpable or overriding error. While the administrative judge
may have disagreed with her conclusion, disagreement with the
result reached does not equate to a failure to enforce the IRSSA
agreement or apply the IAP model, thereby justifying judicial
intervention. If it did, all IAP decisions would be appealable to the
courts, the very thing Schachter forbids. The review adjudicator
conducted the very review of the adjudicator’s factual findings
that is mandated by the IAP by considering whether the adjudicator had made a palpable and overriding error of fact. Both the
adjudicator’s factual findings and the review adjudicator’s review
of them on the palpable and overriding error standard were entitled to the high level of deference imposed by Schachter.
 In Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC
2218, supra, at para. 180, Brown J., who has many years of