proceedings, to name the currency, or a house or other property
that is in issue, as a party, it is a practice that should stop.
 The appellant’s principal submission, on this appeal, is
that the “parties” were entitled to come to a settlement of the
dispute over these moneys, and that the court should generally
honour settlements that are arrived at by “parties”. In this
respect, the appellant points to s. 15.6(3) of the Civil Remedies
Act, 2001, which reads:
15.6(3) The rules of court apply with necessary modifications to the court’s
jurisdiction to make an order in respect of any party or other person in any
proceeding as if the proceeding were in personam and such person were
a named defendant or respondent in the proceeding.
 The appellant relies on s. 15.6(3) for his contention that
the Rules of Civil Procedure are incorporated into any proceedings under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 and, in particular,
Rule 49 regarding settlements. The appellant relies on the provisions of Rule 49 as support for his position that the court ought
to have granted judgment in terms of the settlement reached.
 Accepting that is the effect of s. 15.6(3), all that the Rules
of Civil Procedure do is accord procedural rights to parties to a
civil proceeding. They do not accord substantive rights. The substantive rights must be found in the statute itself. In the case of
the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, those rights are clearly outlined.
 In any event, the problem with the appellant’s position, in
this respect, is that it ignores the fact that the enforcement provisions, relating to settlements under Rule 49, are discretionary.
The court is not obliged to enforce a settlement, just because an
offer to settle was made, and was accepted. The appellant
accepts this is the case. In any event, it is clear from the fact
that rule 49.09 provides that, on a motion to enforce a settlement, a judge “may” grant judgment. It is also consistent with
the court’s approach generally to settlements. The court always
retains a discretion whether to enforce any resolution that parties may arrive at. For example, there may be terms included in
a settlement that the court would, for entirely proper reasons,
refuse to enforce.
 An example of this overriding discretion is found in the
need for court approval of settlements involving persons under
a disability: rule 7.08. The court is not obliged to approve a settlement just because the parties involved have reached it. I note,
in this regard, the point that was made by Robertson C.J.O. in
Poulin v. Nadon,  O.R. 219,  O.J. No. 433 (C.A.)