through penal law, indeed sometimes criminal law and the added
stigma attached to a conviction, exceptional, in my view will be the
case where the liberty or even the security of the person guaranteed under s. 7 should be sacrificed to administrative expediency.
Section 1 may, for reasons of administrative expediency, successfully come to
the rescue of an otherwise violation of s. 7, but only in cases arising out of
exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics and the like.
 The language used by Justice Harris in Beatty appropri-
ately sets out the test for a court to consider when he states
[at para. 14]:
The defence will be available if the accused reasonably believed in a mistaken
set of facts which, if true, would render the act or omission innocent, or if he
took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular event.
 Therefore, if an individual testifies that he did not know
that he was under suspension and that he did not receive notice
from the ministry, in my view, seldom will be the case that he
will not have met the test on a balance of probabilities unless his
evidence is rejected by the presiding justice of the peace or there
is other evidence that can be relied upon to conclude that notice
was given. In such a case, reasons must be given to explain what
evidence the justice of the peace was relying upon in rejecting
the defence of due diligence.
 It is open to a trier of the facts to find that an individual
was not “reasonable in a mistaken set of facts” where he was
negligent in his obligations to make himself aware of the possibility of a suspension. So, for example, a presiding justice of the
peace could reject the evidence of a defendant, if having received
(a) he had not picked up his mail;
(b) he had not open or read his mail making himself wilfully
(c) he did not provide a forwarding address; or
(d) he had moved and not updated his license with the ministry.
 Justice Fairgrieve [in Bellomo] went on to address the
argument that this might make it more difficult for the prosecu-
tion to prove its case [at para. 55]:
Mr. Stinson’s justification was essentially one of law enforcement expedi-
ency. He submitted that it would simply be too easy for anyone charged with
driving while suspended to deny having received the notice that was sent.
People making that assertion, however, would be subject to cross-
examination. The Crown in many cases would be in a position to contradict
such evidence by producing a postal receipt, or by calling evidence of notice