his behaviour was erratic and intimidating”: at para. 95. She
concluded that “this was a legitimate use of a trespass notice to
protect public and staff, so there has been no 2(b) violation of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms”: at para. 101.
 Because she concluded that Mr. Bracken had no right
under s. 2(b) to protest in the manner that he did, the application judge found that his rights had not been limited by government action, and it was therefore not necessary to proceed to
an analysis under s. 1 to determine whether any limits placed
on his rights could be justified. She also determined that the
absence of a s. 2(b) infringement made it unnecessary to consider Mr. Bracken’s further claim under s. 7 of the Charter.
 The application judge dismissed the application.
 The application judge made an error of law in concluding
that Mr. Bracken’s protest did not come within the ambit of
s. 2(b) of the Charter. Consequently, she did not conduct the subsequent analysis to determine whether the expulsion and trespass notice limited Mr. Bracken’s s. 2(b) rights, or whether such
limitation was nevertheless justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
She further erred in concluding that her finding on the s. 2(b)
claim was also dispositive of Mr. Bracken’s s. 7 claim. Additionally, there were palpable and overriding factual errors concerning Mr. Bracken’s conduct on June 16, 2014.
 I will set out below the principles of s. 2(b) jurisprudence,
before conducting the s. 2(b) and s. 1 analyses that ought to have
been performed. I begin by addressing some of the procedural
irregularities of this application.
The Procedural Irregularities
 First, the application was moot at the time it was heard,
as the trespass notice had already expired. The application judge
exercised her discretion to hear it, deciding that the issue was of
some importance, particularly since the conflict was likely to
recur given the relationship between the parties. I agree.
 Second, the form in which the application proceeded
raises some difficulties. Mr. Bracken, who has been self-represented throughout, applied for a declaration that his
Charter rights had been infringed. There was, however, a preliminary
question that was never addressed: whether the town’s expulsion of Mr. Bracken from the premises and the issuance of the
trespass notice was lawful in the circumstances. The application
ought to have been framed, in the first instance, as an application for judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act,