expressed variously in different decisions over the years. In
Irwin Toy, they were summarized as (1) enabling democratic
discourse, (2) facilitating truth seeking, and (3) contributing to
personal fulfillment. In R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola
Canada Beverages (West) Ltd.,  1 S.C.R. 156,  S.C.J.
No. 7, 2002 SCC 8, at para. 32, they were rendered as “
self-fulfilment, participation in social and political decision-making,
and the communal exchange of ideas”. Freedom of expression is
thus not only inherently valuable to the self-constituting person,
but courts have long recognized that it is also instrumental to
the functioning of a healthy political community, particularly by
facilitating the open criticism of government: Ramsden v. Peterborough (City) (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 548,  2 S.C.R. 1084,
 S.C.J. No. 87.
 Although the right is broad, the Supreme Court has identified several limits that are inherent in the right itself.
 Of particular significance to this appeal, acts of physical
violence or threats of violence do not come within the scope of s.
2(b): Irwin Toy, at pp. 969-70 S.C.R.; R. v. Keegstra, 
3 S.C.R. 697,  S.C.J. No. 131; Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366
Québec Inc.,  3 S.C.R. 141,  S.C.J. No. 63, 2005 SCC
62. Violence, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Montréal
(City), at para. 60, “is not excluded because of the message it
conveys (no matter how hateful) but because the method by
which the message is conveyed in not consonant with Charter
protection”. Violence and force are predicated on the denial that
persons are equal in dignity, negating the reciprocity necessary
for communication and genuine dialogue: violence “prevents dialogue rather than fostering it”: Montréal (City), at para. 72.
 The exclusion of acts of violence is one of the few limits on
the protection of expression that is internal to s. 2(b), rather
than operating as one reason among many in determining
whether a limit placed on expression is justified under s. 1. The
rule against violence is thus an exclusionary rule: it excludes by
kind and not by weight: Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, 2nd
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at p. 22. As such,
once it is determined that an act is an act of violence, deliberation is at an end: there is no further information, no other reasons, that can be relevant to the determination of whether a
claim of right under s. 2(b) can succeed. Acts of violence do not
receive the prima facie, defeasible protection that puts government to the task of establishing under s. 1 that the limits
imposed on the claimant are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a society such as ours: the society of a free people, democratically constituted.