See, also, Carter v. Canada (Attorney General),  1 S.C.R.
331,  S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, at para. 44. Further, the
Supreme Court has rejected the notion of the anticipatory overruling by a lower court of a binding authority by a higher court:
Canada v. Craig,  S.C.R. 489,  S.C.J. No. 43, 2012
 In this case, the respondents do not contend that either of
the Bedford conditions, set out above, were satisfied so as to justify departure from the majority opinion in Amberwood.
 The Bedford conditions are not met here. First, unlike
Bedford and Carter, this is not a case involving s. 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Second, no new legal issue
concerning the positive covenants rule, or the possible exceptions to that rule, that were not addressed in Amberwood, was
raised in this case. Third, no significant post-Amberwood developments in the law of Ontario had occurred. I note, in particular,
that the extent to which the decision of the English Court of
Appeal in Wilkinson warrants importation of the benefit and
burden exception into Ontario law, if at all, was a matter for
determination by this court. Neither Wilkinson in England
nor Wentworth Condominium Corporation in Ontario permits
a lower court judge to prefer the minority, over the majority,
opinion of this court in Amberwood.
 To summarize, in a case like this one, a judge of a lower
court may not decline to follow a binding precedent of a higher
court on the ground that he or she disagrees with it or because,
in his or her view, it appears to have been overtaken by subsequent decisions of a lower court in the same jurisdiction, or by
jurisprudential developments in another jurisdiction. In this
case, what the appeal judge should have done was follow
and apply the majority decision in Amberwood and provide
reasons why she viewed it as problematic, rather than decline
to follow it: see, for example, in the constitutional context,
Craig, at para. 21.
(2) Benefit and burden
 Nor are the holdings below that the benefit and burden
exception to the positive covenants rule “reflect[s] the current
law in Ontario”, and that it applies in this case to render the
appellants liable to pay the annual levy contemplated by the
trust deed, sustainable. As I have said, the respondents do not
argue to the contrary on this appeal.
 The benefit and burden exception to the positive covenants rule does not form part of Ontario law at the present
time. In Amberwood, the majority unequivocally held that the