a successor in title of freehold land “would be to enforce a personal obligation against a person who has not covenanted”.
 Accordingly, some other recognized legal principle, other
than acquisition of the property in question with notice of the
term under the trust deed providing for payment of the annual
levy, must apply in order to conclude that the appellants are
bound under the trust deed to pay the annual levy: see
Amberwood, at paras. 33, 50 and 73.
 I turn now to the respondents’ reliance on what the
appeal judge refers to as the conditional grant exception to the
positive covenants rule to ground their claim against the appellants for payment of the outstanding levies.
(3) Conditional grant
 In Amberwood, the application judge had held that there
is a conditional grant exception to the positive covenants rule,
which is essentially a form of the benefit and burden principle:
Amberwood Investments Ltd. v. Durham Condominium Corp.
No. 123 (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 670,  O.J. No. 3386 (S.C.J.),
revd (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), supra, at para. 79. In so
holding, the application judge relied on this description of the
conditional grant exception in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th
ed. vol. 14, at p. 79:
If the facts establish that the granting of a benefit or easement was condi-
tional on assuming the positive obligation, then the obligation is binding.
Where the obligation is framed so as to constitute a continuing obligation
upon which the grant of the easement was conditional, the obligation can be
imposed as an incident of the easement itself, and not merely a liability
purporting to run with the land.
 The majority in Amberwood confirmed, at para. 85, that
the above-quoted description of the exception is consonant with
the positive covenants rule set out in Austerberry. That said,
the majority did not accept that a conditional grant exception
should be recognized under Ontario law as a separate and
distinct exception to the positive covenants rule. The majority
stated, at para. 86:
Hence, as a matter of construction of the creating instrument itself, if a
grant of benefit or easement is framed as conditional upon the continuing
performance of a positive obligation, the positive obligation may well be
enforceable, not because it would run with the land, but because the condition would serve to limit the scope of the grant itself. In effect, the law would
simply be giving effect to the grant. Indeed, as discussed earlier in this
judgment at paras. 30 and 31, much the same reasoning underlies the law of