yet necessary connection in the nature of the benefit and the
burden”. On these bases, she held that both the benefit and burden and conditional grant exceptions to the positive covenants
rule apply in this case to render the appellants liable for the
payment of assessed annual levies under the trust deed.
 With respect, this reasoning is flawed. As I have indicated,
the fact that the appellants had knowledge of the trust deed is
no bar to the operation of the positive covenants rule. And,
although their predecessors in title did so for a lengthy period,
the appellants have not complied with the trust deed since the
date of their acquisition of Ivon Owen’s property. They have not
paid the annual levies for 2010 to 2013, indeed, they have never
agreed to pay the levies, and they disclaim any benefits under
the trust deed. Further, there has been no binding judicial finding that the appellants are beneficiaries of the trust or that,
in fact, they have derived benefits from it.
 The reasons below also fail to explain the basis for
the statement that “a benefit was clearly granted to the Owen
family, conditional on the acceptance of the positive obligation to
pay their share of the annual levies”. In my view, the language
of the trust deed does not support this assertion.
 Simply put, nowhere does the trust deed provide that the
right to the use and enjoyment of the common property conferred under the trust deed is conditional upon the acceptance of
the burdens contained in any of the positive covenants, including the first trust provision that contemplates payment of the
annual levy. To the contrary, the grants of benefit contained in
the trust deed are not framed as conditional upon the continuing
performance of a positive obligation to pay the annual levy or
the performance of any other positive obligation under the trust
deed. And the first trust provision itself does not state that compliance with it is a pre-condition to the use and enjoyment of any
benefit conferred under the trust deed. Consequently, the grants
of benefit under the trust deed are not limited in the manner
discussed by the Amberwood majority.
 In light of this conclusion, I do not reach the appellants’
additional argument that, if the language of the trust deed
creates a limited or conditional grant, the obligation to pay
the annual levy is nonetheless unenforceable as against them
because they have derived no past benefit, and are entitled to
disclaim, as they have done, any present or future benefit under
the trust deed.
 To summarize, on proper application of the authoritative
majority decision in Amberwood, no exception to the operation of
the positive covenants rule recognized under Ontario law applies