Since the appellant provided no evidence of damages, it is
fair to infer that it suffered none. As I will explain, that alone
does not render the forfeiture unconscionable.
(2) Is the forfeiture unconscionable?
 The analysis of unconscionability requires the court to
step back and consider the full commercial context.
 Deposits are commonplace in the operation of the market,
especially for larger assets such as residential and commercial
real estate. Their purpose was explored at learned length by
Newbury J.A. speaking for a five-person panel in Tang v. Zhang,
 B.C.J. No. 180, 2013 BCCA 52, 359 D.L.R. (4th) 104. At
issue in the case was the forfeiture of a deposit of $100,000 on a
residential real estate purchase of slightly more than $2 million.
The trial judge relieved against forfeiture on the basis that the
vendor had been able to re-sell the property for more than
the original purchase price so that he had not suffered any loss.
The court of appeal reversed the trial decision.
 While Newbury J.A. rejected the argument that simply
labelling a payment as a deposit immunized it against the
court’s equitable jurisdiction to relieve from forfeiture, she
declined relief. She distilled several relevant principles from
English and Canadian case law, at para. 30. Two are especially
pertinent to this appeal:
A true deposit is an ancient invention of the law designed to motivate con-
tracting parties to carry through with their bargains. Consistent with its
purpose, a deposit is generally forfeited by a buyer who repudiates the con-
tract, and is not dependant on proof of damages by the other party. If the
contract is performed, the deposit is applied to the purchase price[.]
The deposit constitutes an exception to the usual rule that a sum subject to
forfeiture on the breach of a contract is an unlawful penalty unless it repre-
sents a genuine pre-estimate of damages. However, where the deposit is of
such an amount that the seller’s retention of it would be penal or uncon-
scionable, the court may relieve against forfeiture[.]
 The decision of this court in Peachtree II Associates —
Dallas L.P. v. 857486 Ontario Ltd. (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 362,
 O.J. No. 2749 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
 S.C.C.A. No. 420, is instructive, even though it involved
stipulated penalty clauses, not deposits. The case explored the
distinction between penalties and forfeitures.
 Justice Sharpe noted, at paras. 31-32:
[C]ourts should, if at all possible, avoid classifying contractual clauses as
penalties and, when faced with a choice between considering stipulated
remedies as penalties or forfeitures, favour the latter.