Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44. Its registered
head office was located in Mississauga, Ontario and its executive
office was located in Hong Kong. The respondent has brought
this action alleging that the appellant has perpetuated a significant fraud on Sino-Forest Corporation, its creditors and investors.
 Sino-Forest Corporation was a forest product company
with assets predominantly located in the People’s Republic of
China. It carried out a sale process through the Companies’
Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the “CCAA”),
which ultimately failed.
 Sino-Forest Corporation then applied under the CCAA for
an order approving a plan of compromise and reorganization.
On December 12, 2012, the Superior Court of Justice sanctioned
the plan. The respondent was appointed as trustee of the SFC
Litigation Trust, which was assigned all of the litigation rights
of Sino-Forest Corporation. Pursuant to the plan, substantially
all of the assets of Sino-Forest Corporation were transferred to
Emerald Plantation Holding Ltd. (“Emerald Plantation”). The
accepted situs of the trust is in Hong Kong where the trustee
 On August 28, 2014, the respondent brought an ex parte
motion for a worldwide injunction against the appellant.
The motion judge found that there was “a very strong
prima-facie case of fraud on the part of [the appellant]” and granted
 In April 2015, the appellant brought a motion to vary,
set aside or discharge the injunction, arguing that the motion
judge had applied the wrong test in granting the injunction.
Specifically, the appellant argued that a Mareva injunction could
only be granted if a defendant has assets in the jurisdiction,
which the appellant did not. The motion judge denied the appellant’s motion, holding that the test for a Mareva injunction did
not require that a defendant have assets in the jurisdiction.
 Rule 40.03 [of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990,
Reg. 194] requires a party seeking an injunction to undertake to
abide by any order concerning damages that the court may make
if it ultimately appears that the granting of the order has caused
damage to the responding party for which the moving party
ought to compensate the responding party, unless the court
 When granting the Mareva injunction on the ex parte
motion the motion judge required a personal undertaking from
the respondent as to damages. As the appellant notes, the
respondent did not give a personal undertaking for more than
a year after the injunction was obtained ex parte.