It is only in the penultimate paragraph of their reasons
[at para. 62] that the court states that it agrees with the
view that a plaintiff with a cause of action for fraud should be
given assurance of recovery under a judgment and they have
“sought to point out the conditions that must be satisfied before
a Mareva injunction can be granted”.
 Since Chitel was decided, Ontario courts have consistently
referenced and applied that decision in relation to Mareva
injunctions: see 2057552 Ontario Inc. v. Dick,  O.J. No.
2545, 2015 ONSC 3182 (S.C.J.).
 The appellant asserts that the Chitel criteria are well-known and are firmly-established as the criteria a plaintiff must
satisfy to be granted a Mareva injunction from an Ontario court.
Failure to satisfy any one of those criteria is an independent
ground for setting aside the Mareva order. The appellant’s position is that in order to obtain an injunction, there is a substantive requirement that a defendant have assets in the jurisdiction
to be subject to the restraining order. The appellants say there
must be assets in this jurisdiction to ensure the order of the
court is capable of implementation.
 I do not accept the appellant’s assertion. I recognize that
in Chitel the injunction was sought to restrain the dissipation of
assets in Ontario. Similarly, in virtually all of the cases referenced by counsel on this appeal, the assets which were at the
risk of dissipation existed in Ontario.
 However, a court’s in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant justifying the issuance of a Mareva injunction is not
dependant, related to or “tied to” a requirement that a defendant
has some assets in the jurisdiction.
 Section 101(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. C.43 provides the court with jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory junction or mandatory order “where it appears to a judge of
the court to be just or convenient to do so”.
 A Mareva injunction is an equitable remedy and as such
I agree with the respondent’s submission that this remedy
evolves as facts and circumstances merit.
 The availability of the equitable remedy of a Mareva
injunction in England has evolved. This evolution was com-
mented on by Sharpe J.A. in Injunctions and Specific Perfor-
mance, looseleaf (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2015), where he
observed, at para. 2.910, the following:
The strict rule requiring assets in the jurisdiction has now been abandoned
and, in special circumstances the English courts will grant Mareva Orders
to restrain disposition of assets elsewhere. The basis upon which “world-
wide” Mareva Orders are made is that the English courts assert “unlimited