Since Chitel, the courts of Ontario have followed the
requirements set down in Chitel for granting Mareva injunctions. See, for example, DiMenza v. Richardson Greenshields of
Canada Ltd. (1989), 74 O.R. (2d) 172,  O.J. No. 3231 (Div.
Ct.); United States of America v. Yemec (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 52,
 O.J. No. 1165 (Div. Ct.); Croatian (Toronto) Credit Union
Ltd. v. Vinski,  O.J. No. 700, 2010 ONSC 1197 (S.C.J.);
Sibley & Associates LP v. Ross (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 494, 
O.J. No. 2656 (S.C.J.); 2057552 Ontario Inc. v. Dick,  O.J.
No. 2545, 2015 ONSC 3182 (S.C.J.).
 In Aetna, the Supreme Court considered the question of
whether a Mareva injunction was available in a federal setting.
In considering the issue, the court canvassed how the courts of
Canada have dealt with the Mareva injunction. In so doing, the
court referred to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chitel and the
test it established. Estey J. summarized the Chitel decision as
follows, at para. 30: “In summary, the Ontario Court of Appeal
recognized Lister as the general rule, and Mareva as a ‘limited
exception’ to it, the exceptional injunction being available only
where there is a real risk that the defendant will remove his
assets from the jurisdiction or dissipate those assets ‘to avoid the
possibility of a judgment . . .’”.
 Section 101(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. C.43 provides, in part, that in the Superior Court of Justice,
an interlocutory injunction may be granted where it appears to
a judge of the court to be “just or convenient to do so”.
 As noted by McRurer C.J.H.C. in Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co. v. Ball,  O.R. 843,  O.J. No. 693 (H.C.J.),
at p. 854 O.R., the granting of an interlocutory injunction is
a matter of judicial discretion, “but it is a discretion to be exercised on judicial principles”.
 Whether the requirements for the issuance of a Mareva
injunction as set out in Chitel are referred to as “guidelines”,
“rules”, “criteria”, “requirements” or a “test”, they represent the
judicial principles upon which the court shall exercise its discretion to issue a Mareva injunction.
 In the present case, there is no issue that the appellant
had no assets in Ontario or in Canada. In such circumstances,
the respondent was unable to meet the requirement in Chitel
that the appellant had assets in the jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the motion judge erred in granting the Mareva in this case
with the result that it should be set aside. In my view, Chitel
remains the law of Ontario and it does not lie in this court
to hold otherwise.