endorsement, is CAD$1 million. OPCF 44R also includes a formula, however, setting out the maximum coverage payable in
a particular case under the endorsement. Security National
argues that, when this formula is applied, the maximum payable under OPCF 44R is nothing.
 The provision in question is s. 4 of OPCF 44R. In making
its argument, Security National relies, in particular, on the
words that I have underlined:
4. The insurer’s maximum liability under this change form, regardless of the
number of eligible claimants or insured persons injured or killed or the
number of automobiles insured under the Policy, is the amount by which the
limit of family protection coverage exceeds the total of all limits of motor
vehicle liability insurance, or bonds, or cash deposits, or other financial
guarantee as required by law in lieu of insurance, of the inadequately
insured motorist and of any other person jointly liable with that motorist.
 Security National takes the position that the “total of all
limits” payable by Minnesota is the US$1,500,000 single occurrence cap provided for in subdivision 4(g) of the Tort Claims Act.
Security National argues that since its maximum liability under
OPCF 44R of CAD$1 million does not exceed the single occurrence cap, its liability to Mr. Hartley is zero.
 This argument is a contrivance. In identifying the limits
on what Minnesota will cover, Security National is attempting to
avoid using the US$500,000 maximum available to Mr. Hartley
under subdivision 4(c) of the Minnesota Tort Claims Act.
Instead, Security National seeks to employ the maximum
payable to multiple claimants that Mr. Hartley has no right, as
an individual, to enjoy.
 A similar argument was attempted in Craig and was
flatly rejected. In that case, the school board that employed the
tortfeasor had an excess insurance policy with a US$700,000
limit. The policy was not available to the benefit of the injured
plaintiffs, the Craigs. The Craigs’ insurance company nonetheless argued that the excess insurance policy would produce a
coverage ratio that would reduce the company’s maximum liability to zero under an endorsement provision identical to s. 4 of
OPCF 44R. With good reason, the motion judge took issue with
the insurance company’s attempt to avoid liability by relying on
coverage not available to the Craigs. He commented that “[t]he
logic of this defeats the purpose of the . . . coverage, that is, to
protect insureds from tortfeasors who have insurance which is
inadequate to cover the plaintiff’s damages” (emphasis in original): Craig v. Allstate Insurance Co. of Canada,  O.J.
No. 834, 26 C.C.L.I. (3d) 136 (S.C.J.), at para. 40.