While the Guidelines may be useful in this case as a check, for the reasons
that follow, I am not persuaded that that they should be applied as a simple
matter of arithmetic.
 In the fourth section, the motion judge analyzed the
extent to which the wife’s spousal support should be varied.
 In reaching a conclusion, he reviewed a number of considerations: the circumstances of both parties; the positions of the
parties; various legal principles including s. 17(7) of the Divorce
Act; the Guidelines factors that could result in high-end spousal
support; and principles from various authorities, including
Cymbalisty v. Cymbalisty,  M.J. No. 398, 2003 MBCA 138,
180 Man. R. (2d) 112; Marinangeli v. Marinangeli (2003),
66 O.R. (3d) 40,  O.J. No. 2819 (C.A.); Thompson v.
Thompson,  O.J. No. 4001, 2003 ONSC 5500 (S.C.J.);
Putsai v. Putsai,  O.J. No. 3624, 2014 ONCA 422, 319
O.A.C. 403; Gray v. Gray and Boston v. Boston, supra.
 Although the motion judge found that, if $57,500 were
added to the husband’s annual income, the Guidelines would
produce a range for spousal support of between $6,000 and
$8,000 per month, he concluded [at para. 151] that two factors in
particular made the “underlying assumptions of the [Guidelines]
 Those factors were, first, the fact that there was some element of luck unrelated to the wife’s contributions to the husband’s
career inherent in the husband’s opportunity to obtain the early
pension payout. But for the opportunity to retire early, the husband may have continued to work as anticipated in the separation
agreement. In the motion judge’s view [at para. 150], the husband’s early pension payout “should not be an opportunity for the
court to revisit [the wife’s] financial decisions after separation”.
 The second factor was that the wife had been mismanaging her affairs since separation and had been unreasonable with
 The motion judge then turned to the factors identified in
s. 17(7) of the Divorce Act. While acknowledging the wife’s contribution to the husband’s professional success, the motion
judge [at para. 153] could not see any continuing factor relating
to the care of the children “other than to the extent that [the
wife] took care of the children to allow [the husband’s] success”.
Further, the motion judge concluded [at para. 155] that the
economic hardship the wife was suffering did not arise from
the breakdown of the marriage but, rather, from her mismanagement of the equalization payment in 2008. In his view,
“[e]ffectively requiring [the husband] to pay [the wife’s] debts
would not promote economic self-sufficiency”.