included a grant of exclusive possession of Richard and Ingrid’s
matrimonial home. This, it is said, means that Theadora’s interest is no longer identical in nature, extent and duration to Richard’s or Ingrid’s, and that both Richard and Ingrid hold their
interests as tenants in common. Marjolein’s submission relies on
Rules 1 and 3.
 This submission must be rejected.
 First, as to Rule 1, assuming that the 2009 separation
agreement between Richard and Ingrid was valid and enforceable — a matter not addressed by the application judge — it
did no more than express an intention to convey Richard’s
interest in the Flos Road property in the future. It is not clear
that an expression of intention is sufficient to achieve severance: see Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Elements
of Land Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
at p. 950.
 The agreement is ambiguous, as might be expected
given the parties’ lack of legal advice. But the submission
that conveyance of Richard’s interest, and the grant of exclu-
sive possession, severed the joint tenancy fails in any event,
for a more fundamental reason. Where, as here, there are three
joint tenants, the conveyance of one joint tenant’s interest
to another, or the grant of exclusive possession by one joint
tenant to another, severs only the interest of the joint tenant
making the conveyance or granting exclusive possession. It
does not sever the whole of the joint tenancy. As Latham C.J.
explains in Wright v. Gibbons (1949), 78 C.L.R. 313 (H.C.A),
at pp. 324-25:
If there are three joint tenants, A, B and C, and one joint tenant A trans-
fers his interest to another joint tenant B, the result is that A then has
no interest in the land, B becomes a tenant in common as to one-third
interest in the land, and remains a joint tenant with C as to a two-thirds
See, also, Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, 8th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), at p. 513; Gray, at pp. 947-48,
Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2014), at pp. 344-45; and Anger & Honsberger Law of Real
Property, looseleaf, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2016),
at para. 14.20.120.
 Thus, the 2009 separation agreement could sever no more
than Richard’s one-third interest in the joint tenancy. The joint
tenancy held by Theadora and Ingrid over their two-thirds
interest of the Flos Road property would subsist, with Richard
holding a one-third interest as a tenant in common. When
Theadora died, the two-thirds interest she held jointly with