Ingrid passed to Ingrid by survivorship, leaving no portion of the
property to pass to her estate.
 If, on the other hand, the separation agreement did not
have the effect of severing Richard’s interest in the joint tenancy,
then the joint tenancy continued. On Theadora’s death, her one-third interest would have passed to Richard and Ingrid by right
of survivorship, leaving no portion of the property to pass to her
estate. Richard and Ingrid would have become joint tenants of
the whole of the Flos Road property.
 Thus, in either case, no part of the Flos Road property
would become part of the estate.
 Marjolein’s submission that the joint tenancy was severed
by the provision in the 2009 separation agreement that Richard
and Ingrid’s children would inherit the property must also be
rejected. In general, a joint tenancy is unaffected by a will,
because property is conveyed pursuant to the joint tenancy outside the terms of the will: see Ziff, at pp. 345-46. However, even
assuming that the simultaneous execution of mutual wills could
have the effect of severing a joint tenancy, no finding was made
that mutual wills were executed in this case.
 Marjolein’s submission that the parties made a mutual
decision to sever the joint tenancy must also be rejected.
 As the court explained in Hansen, at para. 7:
A proper application of the course of dealing test for severing a joint
tenancy requires the court to discern whether the parties intended to
mutually treat their interests in the property as constituting a tenancy in
common. It is not essential that the party requesting a severance estab-
lish that the co-owners’ conduct falls into a formulation found to have had
the effect of severing a joint tenancy in other cases. The court’s inquiry
cannot be limited to matching fact patterns to those in prior cases. Rather,
the court must look to the co-owners’ entire course of conduct — in other
words the totality of the evidence — in order to determine if they intended
that their interests were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in
common. This evidence may manifest itself in different ways.
 In short, Hansen requires a court to determine, having
regard to all of the evidence, whether the parties intended
to treat their interests as constituting a tenancy in common.
This is a fact-specific inquiry that is subject to deference on
 As noted above, the application judge found “not one scintilla of evidence” that the parties intended to mutually treat the
tenancy as a tenancy in common. He found, further, that Richard and Ingrid’s 2009 separation agreement did “not evidence a
course of conduct to sever the bona fide joint tenancy”. This was
so in spite of any divided living or exclusive possession arrangements related to the occupation of the property.