Furthermore, the application judge found that Theadora
received legal advice from a lawyer who knew her well; that she
understood the consequences of joint tenancy as opposed to tenancy in common; and that she was mentally engaged and cognitive until her death.
 The application judge did not wrongly rely on evidence of
notes documenting Theadora’s visit to her lawyer’s office in September 2004 and a phone call made to the office in November
2004, in determining her intention concerning the gift. The
application judge’s reasons, and in particular para. 148, do not
reflect acceptance of the notes on Theadora’s visit as evidence of
intention. Rather, the notes were part of the narrative explaining the steps that led to title being in the names of Theadora
and Richard and the contents of the codicil. This would also
help explain why the appellant took no objection at trial to the
admission of the notes.
 As for the note documenting the November 2004 call,
although it was not admissible for the truth of its contents, its
use was limited and served to provide a chronology of a visit that
Marjolein’s husband admitted he made to Theadora. Theadora’s
upset could reasonably be inferred from the evidence proffered
by the appellant including her incendiary letter sent to her
mother dated November 29, 2004; the will and codicil made two
days later; the appellant’s testimony that her mother would not
talk to her; and the fact that November 29, 2004 was the last
time the appellant talked to her mother. We note also the application judge’s finding of Theadora’s independence and capacity;
Theadora’s estrangement from the appellant; and the application judge’s credibility findings favouring Ingrid. In sum, the
note of the telephone call had no material bearing on the outcome of the application.
Was Theadora subject to undue influence?
 Marjolein submits that the application judge erred by, in
effect, requiring her to establish undue influence rather than
simply demonstrate that the relationship of the parties gave rise
to a potential for undue influence.
 There is no merit to this submission.
 The application judge applied the law as set out in Foley,
in which this court noted, at para. 28, that the presumption of
undue influence applies “[w]here the potential for domination
inheres in the relationship between the transferor and transferee”, citing Goodman Estate v. Geffen,  2 S.C.R. 353,
 S.C.J. No. 53, at p. 378 S.C.R. Where the presumption
applies, the transferee must establish that a gift was the result