The application judge correctly identified the essential
elements of a gift as being (a) the donor’s intention to make
a gift; (b) acceptance of the gift by the donee; and (c) delivery of
the gift to the donee.
 He found the first two requirements had been met. Mary
intended to make a gift of $100,000. She had the necessary
mental capacity to make the gift and she believed she had the
money in her account. Arlindo had accepted the gift, which he
attempted to realize by taking the cheque first to Mary’s bank,
then to his own.
 But the application judge held that the third requirement
— delivery — had not been established. The gift had not been
perfected by delivery because Mary did not have sufficient funds
in her account. She could not give what she did not have. While
she did have sufficient funds in other accounts, the bank could
not have transferred those funds without direction from her.
 The application judge also rejected Arlindo’s argument
that the cheque was payment for services rendered. His good
acts could not be characterized as “consideration” and there was
no evidence of a contract.
 The application judge also held that the doctrine of estoppel by convention did not apply on the facts of the case. The test
in the leading case of Ryan v. Moore,  2 S.C.R. 53, 
S.C.J. No. 38, 2005 SCC 38 was not made out because Arlindo
had not changed his legal position in reliance on a shared
 Consequently, the application judge held that the gift of
$100,000 by cheque was not enforceable. He dismissed Arlindo’s
application, with costs of $14,000.
C. The Appellant’s Submissions
 The appellant advances a number of alternative submissions, in an attempt to avoid what he submits is an unfair result.
 First, he advances a claim in contract, arguing that his
good deeds provided some consideration.
 Second, he submits that the cheque was enforceable by
virtue of the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4 (“BEA”).
As part of this argument, he submits that the cheque was dishonoured when it was taken to Mary’s bank, giving him an
immediate right of recourse.
 Third, the appellant renews his argument that the gift
by cheque was perfected by delivery.
 Fourth, he relies on equity. He invokes estoppel by convention and the principle that “equity will not strive officiously
to defeat a gift”.