v. McNamee (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 401,  O.J. No. 3396, 2011
ONCA 533, at para. 23. In Peter v. Beblow,  1 S.C.R. 980,
 S.C.J. No. 36, McLachlin J. (as she was then) described
the “central element of a gift at law” as the “intentional giving
to another without expectation of remuneration”: at pp. 991-92
 The three elements of a legally valid gift identified by the
application judge and referred to at para. 10, above, are well
established: (1) an intention to make a gift on the part of the
donor, without consideration or expectation of remuneration;
(2) an acceptance of the gift by the donee; and (3) a sufficient act
of delivery or transfer of the property to complete the transaction: McNamee v. McNamee, at para. 24. All three requirements
are essential: Mary Jane Mossman and William F. Flanagan,
Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications Limited, 2004), at p. 441.
 The first two elements are not at issue on this appeal. The
central issue here is whether the delivery of the cheque for
$100,000 into the hands of the appellant could be a sufficient act
of delivery of the gift. The wrinkle in this case is that there were
insufficient funds in Mary’s account.
 The delivery requirement has been a part of the modern
law of gifts since the seminal case of Irons v. Smallpiece (1819),
2 B. & A. 551. The delivery requirement is an important distin-
guishing feature of gifts as compared to other methods of trans-
ferring property, such as by contract. As Mossman and Flanagan
note in Property Law: Cases and Commentary, at p. 442:
The delivery requirement marks an important difference between contract
law and the law of gifts. A contract involves an exchange of promises. A gift,
a unilateral promise, does not. Contract law will enforce an exchange of
promises (a “bargain” promise) with expectation damages. On the other
hand, the law of gifts attaches no significance to a unilateral promise to pay
in the absence of delivery.
 The delivery requirement in the law of gifts continues to
serve several important functions. It forces a would-be donor to
consider the consequences of their expressed intention to make
a gift and it furnishes tangible proof that a gift has in fact
been made: see Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 2014), at pp. 161-62. See, also, Philip
Mechem, “Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of
Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments” (1926),
21 Ill. L. Rev. 341, at pp. 348-52.