No. 3213, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 251 (C.A.), and the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Mordo v. Nitting,  B.C.J.
No. 3081, 2006 BCSC 1761, at paras. 271-72, do not refer to the
equitable principle invoked by the appellant. The former endorses
the principle that a transfer of shares may be effective as between
donor and donee notwithstanding that further acts might be
required to make the transfer effective in law. The latter case was
one in which everything necessary had been done to create a valid
trust. Pennington v. Waine was also a case involving shares.
T. Choithram International S.A. v. Pagarani was a trust case in
which property was given to an already constituted trust.
 In Pennington v. Waine, Lady Justice Arden observed, at
para. 62, that “[t]here must also be, in the interests of legal
certainty, a clearly ascertainable point in time at which it can
be said that the gift was completed, and this point in time must
be arrived at on a principled basis”. I respectfully agree with
that observation in the context of this case, which involves the
well-settled law concerning the delivery of a gift by way of
cheque. The temptation to “temper the wind to the shorn
lamb”, the allegory used in that case, should be resisted when
it conflicts with settled law. I see no basis for its application in
 The application judge’s costs order was discretionary. He
considered the relevant principles with respect to costs, including
those set out in rule 57.01 [of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O.
1990, Reg. 194]. He also considered the principles set out in the
leading case of Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the
Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291,  O.J. No. 2634
(C.A.), and the “modern approach” to costs in estate litigation
expressed in McDougald Estate v. Gooderham,  O.J. No.
2432, 255 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (C.A.). He noted as well the appellant’s
refusal of what he described as a “generous offer” of settlement.
The appellant has demonstrated no basis on which this court
could find an error in the exercise of the application judge’s discretion with respect to costs. I would not grant leave to appeal costs.
 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal, with costs
to the respondents in the amount of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.