evidentiary rule in Hallum v. Canadian Memorial Chiropractic
College (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 119,  O.J. No. 1399 (H.C.J.),
at pp. 9-10 O.R.:
A litigant who falls within one of the categories created by rule 56.01(a) to
(f), and who relies on his impecuniosity to avoid an order requiring that he
post security, must do more than adduce some evidence of impecuniosity.
The onus rests on him to satisfy the court that he is impecunious . . . The
onus rests on the party relying on impecuniosity, not by virtue of the lan-
guage of rule 56.01, but because his financial capabilities are within his
knowledge and are not known to his opponent; and because he asserts his
impecuniosity as a shield against an order as to security for costs.
 In my view, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that they are impecunious. The only relevant evi-
dence filed in their responding motion record consists of three
settlement agreements between Chevron and third parties who
had previously funded the Ecuadorian plaintiffs in this litiga-
tion. These third party funders have disavowed their financial
interest in the Ecuadorian judgment, in the light of the New
 Chevron and Chevron Canada object that these settlement agreements are not properly in evidence. They are not
proven by affidavit and were filed after the Ecuadorian plaintiffs
advised that they would not be tendering any responding evidence on the motion, thus preventing cross-examination and
reply evidence. I need not address this evidentiary dispute,
as I agree with Chevron and Chevron Canada that these settlement agreements do not assist the Ecuadorian plaintiffs in
demonstrating impecuniosity. What the settlement agreements
demonstrate is that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs have received a
significant amount of funding for this litigation in the past. They
leave unanswered the question of whether the Ecuadorian plaintiffs have other funding available to them — a question that the
Ecuadorian plaintiffs declined to answer.
 The Ecuadorian plaintiffs have filed no other evidence as
to their finances beyond these three settlement agreements.
There is no supporting evidence as to their income, expenses and
liability. This can hardly be called “robust particularity”. We
know nothing about the individual circumstances of any of the
47 Ecuadorian plaintiffs — and perhaps more importantly, their
 Accordingly, I conclude that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate impecuniosity. I must assume that ordering
security for costs will not end this litigation.