Relying on ss. 30(1)(d), 67 and 71 of the BIA, Giffen (Re),
 1 S.C.R. 91,  S.C.J. No. 11 and Lefebvre (Trustee of);
Tremblay (Trustee of),  3 S.C.R. 326,  S.C.J. No. 62,
2004 SCC 63, the appellants submit that, where claims such as
these are advanced by a trustee in bankruptcy, there can be
no question but that the trustee in bankruptcy steps into the
shoes of the bankrupt and does not bring the action in a representative capacity on behalf of the unsecured creditors. As the
bankrupts gave the alleged usurious promissory notes and paid
the alleged unlawful commissions, there can also be no question
that they knew of their potential claims when they paid the
sums at issue.
 The appellants argue that the motion judge’s reasons
disclose that, in dismissing their motion to strike, he finally
determined that ( i) the respondent is not a person advancing
its claims through a predecessor in right, title or interest under
s. 12 of the Act; and ( ii) the limitation clock therefore runs
based on the respondent’s knowledge of the claims, rather than
the bankrupts’ knowledge of the claims. As an example, they
point to paras. 132 to 134 of the motion judge’s reasons, where
It was not until the Trustee’s Fourth Report dated May 30, 2014 that the
Trustee was able to confirm with certainty that usurious interest rates and
unlawful commissions were being received.
Notwithstanding the arguments put forward by the [appellants] that the
[respondent’s] claims are statute-barred because discoverability is based on
the date that Golden Oaks discovered or should have discovered the claim,
the Court finds that because of the fraudulent scheme, the matter was not
discoverable or discovered until the Fourth Report was prepared in May
2014. Therefore, the Court finds that the discoverability clock ran from the
time that the Fourth Report was prepared.
All of the Trustee’s Statements of Claim were issued by July 2015. Therefore, the Court finds that these claims are not statute barred.
 The appellants assert that the motion judge’s finding that
the respondent is not a person claiming through a predecessor
under s. 12 of the Act will make that issue res judicata or subject
to issue estoppel. Accordingly, as the appellants will be barred
from raising that defence in the future, the motion judge’s order
is a final order: Ball v. Donais (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 322, 
O.J. No. 972 (C.A.), at p. 324 O.R.
( ii) The respondent’s position
 At the appeal hearing, respondent’s counsel indicated
they had initially advised the appellants’ counsel that they took
the position the order under appeal is interlocutory. However,