and where the respondent seeks to advance what may be a novel
claim. In particular, although the respondent has delivered a
statement of claim, it is not yet clear what allegations it will
make in response to a limitations defence, for example, whether
explicit allegations of fraud will be made and against whom such
allegations, if any, will be made, i.e., against the bankrupts
or against the bankrupts and the appellants. See, also, Tran v.
University of Western Ontario,  O.J. No. 6645, 2016 ONCA
978, at paras. 19 to 21.
 The respondent’s claim may be novel, at least in part,
because rather than asserting that it stands in the shoes of the
bankrupts or that representative claims for unjust enrichment
are authorized in this case by statute, the respondent, as trustee in bankruptcy, purports to act in a representative capacity
for unsecured creditors because the claims are premised on
fraudulent conduct of the bankrupts. As we have said, the
allegations of fraud are not yet clearly defined — but they
could be more clearly defined in a reply responding to a limitations defence.
 Further, it is also not clear to what extent the respondent
will rely, in responding to any limitations defences, on assertions
about when the bankrupts, or either of them, knew or ought to
have known that “a proceeding would be an appropriate means
to seek a remedy” within the meaning of s. 5(1) of the
Limitations Act, 2002. Any such assertions may well raise issues of
mixed fact and law.
 As indicated above, the example on which this court relied
in the footnote tied to para. 21 of Beardsley was neither legally
nor factually complex. Beardsley pre-dated the enactment of
the Limitations Act, 2002, and the example this court posited
involved a straightforward, undisputed fact situation in which
the cause of action had accrued and to which the discoverability
rule did not apply. That is not this case.
 In our view, the appellants’ motion was premature. We
conclude that the motion judge could not properly have made a
final determination of the limitations issue in favour of the
appellants prior to the close of pleadings and without the benefit
of a more fulsome record. In these circumstances, his reasons for
dismissing the appellants’ motion should not be read as a final
determination of the limitations issue in favour of the respondent giving rise to res judicata or issue estoppel.
 Particularly in light of our conclusion that the appellants’
motion was premature, this is not an appropriate case to seek
permission from the chief justice of the Superior Court to reconstitute ourselves as a panel of the Divisional Court to dispose of