public confidence in the administration of justice. Thus, there is a broader
public interest in reviewability that transcends an individual’s interest in
any given case.
 Moldaver J. also held, at para. 48, that in the final balancing of the factors informing public confidence, appellate
judges should be mindful of the anticipated delay in deciding an
appeal, noting that where all or a significant portion of the sentence will be served before the appeal can be decided, “bail takes
on greater significance if the reviewability interest is to remain
 Finally, Moldaver J. gave guidance to panels of appellate
court judges reviewing decisions of single judges on bail, and to
chief justices in deciding whether to direct a panel review. As to
the former, he observed, at paras. 61-62:
Ultimately, in my view, a panel reviewing a decision of a single judge
under s. 680(1) should be guided by the following three principles. First,
absent palpable and overriding error, the review panel must show deference
to the judge’s findings of fact. Second, the review panel may intervene and
substitute its decision for that of the judge where it is satisfied that the
judge erred in law or in principle, and the error was material to the out-
come. Third, in the absence of legal error, the review panel may intervene
and substitute its decision for that of the judge where it concludes that the
decision was clearly unwarranted.
This approach allows for meaningful review while extending a measure of
deference to the judge’s decision.
 He addressed the responsibility of the chief justice, at
The test, as I see it, should be relatively straightforward in its application.
It flows from the principles the panel is required to apply when conducting
a review. In short, the chief justice should consider directing a review
where it is arguable that the judge committed material errors of fact or law
in arriving at the impugned decision, or that the impugned decision was
clearly unwarranted in the circumstances.
 With this background, I turn to the submissions of counsel.
 The applicant argues that the bail judge erred in law by
misapplying the Supreme Court’s decision in Oland. In particular, he argues that the bail judge adopted an overly expansive
reading of the “public confidence” test and permitted the apparently weak merits of the appeal to overwhelm the balance of the
analysis. He also asserts that the bail judge’s decision was
“clearly unwarranted”, in the sense used in Oland.
 The applicant submits that the Supreme Court in Oland
instructed courts to adopt a restrained approach to the public