was to be voluntary disclosure, there is a risk that it would be
done in a vacuum or on an ad hoc basis which could make these
decisions arbitrary or specific to individual hospitals’ rules, raising the possibility of inconsistent disclosure of the same information. This risk would be contained were abortion-related
services to fall under FIPPA through centralized protocol for the
release of this information.
 I am satisfied that the applicants have demonstrated that
there are no countervailing considerations that would apply in
these circumstances which would be inconsistent with production. Examples cited of such considerations in Criminal Lawyers’
Assn. are solicitor-client privilege, judicial prejudgment memos
and notes and cabinet confidences: see Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.,
at paras. 39-40. These examples do not apply here.
 While I agree with the applicants that there are no
apparent countervailing considerations to negate the derivative
right to access non-identifying statistical information, I am not
able to conclude that none possibly exist. It may depend on the
nature of the record. Some non-identifying statistical information may raise countervailing considerations particularly
when dealing with specific known institutions. It is not an exercise that seems to have ever been properly done and it would fall
to Ontario to start the process.
 Having satisfied me on the absence of countervailing considerations at least for non-identifying statistical information,
I conclude that s. 65(5.7) of FIPPA breaches the applicants’
derivative right to access to information provided under s. 2(b) of
( iii) Section 1 of the Charter
 As I have concluded a breach of s. 2(b), I must move on to
s. 1 of the Charter to determine if the subject breach can be justified as a reasonable limit imposed in a free and democratic society.
 Section 1 of the Charter provides:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
 Any limit on a Charter right must meet the following two
criteria set out in R. v. Oakes,  1 S.C.R. 103,  S.C.J.
No. 7, at pp. 138-39 S.C.R., in order to be regarded as a reasona-
(1) the objective which the limit is designed to serve must be
of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitu-
tionally protected right; and