(2) the means chosen to attain the objective are reasonably and
 The second criterion in the Oakes test has three components. First, the measure must be carefully designed to achieve
the objective in question, in the sense of being rationally connected to the important objective that the limitation is designed
to serve. Second, the measure should impair the right or freedom in question as little as possible. Finally, there must be proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure and its
objective: see Oakes, at p. 139 S.C.R.
 I have little difficulty following authorities which identify
the importance of protecting the privacy and safety of patients
seeking an abortion and those involved in the provision of abortion services: see Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman (1994),
20 O.R. (3d) 229,  O.J. No. 1864, 1994 CarswellOnt 151
(Gen. Div.). This is on its own a limit which is of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected
right such as the access to records in circumstances such
 Ontario has identified the purpose of the impugned provision was to address the concern that disclosure of records relating to the provision of abortion services could pose risks to the
safety and security of their patients, health care providers and
other staff. Ontario also identified the need to allow hospitals to
decide if they wish to voluntarily disclose records relating to the
provision of abortion services.
 When considering the latter of the stated objectives, I do
not accept that it was realistically envisaged that hospitals or
other institutions identified a need to be able to disclose records
concerning abortion services voluntarily. No example was provided when this has been done since the adoption of s. 65(5.7) of
FIPPA, and there is no policy framework in place to encourage
that it be done.
 As for the main stated objective by Ontario, being to
address the concern that disclosure of records relating to the
provision of abortion services could pose risks to the safety
and security of their patients, health care providers and other
staff, this broadly stated objective must be considered within its
proper context. First, personal health information was already
protected in PHIPA. By virtue of s. 8(1) of PHIPA, specific
patients’ abortion-related information was already excluded
from the operation of FIPPA independent of s. 65(5.7).