disclosed where there was no identifying information associated
with individuals or facilities. I agree that hospitals or specific
institutions may have warranted special treatment. I conclude
that s. 65(5.7) does not minimally impair the right to access to
records relating to the provision of abortion services.
 Finally, the issue of proportionality is clearly missing.
Ontario’s decision of excluding all records relating to the provision of abortion services no matter how general and how non-identifying is in no way proportional to protecting the privacy
and safety of those involved. In addition, the arguments of
Ontario that the information can be provided voluntarily are not
supported by the evidence. The only two examples given were
information provided by Ontario after requiring the applicant
Patricia Maloney to embark in costly litigation to object to a
refusal to provide records. There is no evidence in these proceedings of any policy framework in place for any institution that
provides abortion services. The argument by Ontario that the
applicants have not requested information directly fails in the
absence of any evidence that such requests would be received
favourably by individual institutions or the ministry.
 In the end, I am unable to conclude that Ontario made
any real attempt to address the components of the second criterion in the Oakes test. While this is not a requirement to effect
legislative change, consideration must still be given to the type
of issues which form part of the Oakes test. Ontario has thus
failed to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that s. 65(5.7) of
FIPPA can be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
 I therefore conclude that s. 65(5.7) of FIPPA infringes
s. 2(b) of the Charter and is not saved by s. 1 of the Charter.
 The applicants have argued that in the event of a declaration of invalidity, the previous process of having request for documents relating to abortion services dealt with under FIPPA
would be appropriate. Alternatively, they have not opposed a
suspension of a declaration of invalidity. They suggest that six to
12 months would be sufficient.
 Ontario argues that 12 months is necessary and common
to allow for the adoption of remedial legislation.
 I accept the position of Ontario on the appropriate remedy
as a result of my finding that s. 65(5.7) infringes s. 2(b) of the
Charter. Accordingly, s. 65(5.7) of FIPPA is declared to be of
no force or effect by reason of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The effect of the declaration of invalidity is suspended for
a period of 12 months. The manner in which the legislation