maintaining that the 2014 by-law could not be applied retroactively. Airpark did apply under the 2014 by-law for a permit to
complete its work. Burlington refused to process that application
unless Airpark submitted an application for a permit under the
2014 by-law relating to the work that had been performed before
the 2014 by-law was enacted.
B. Decision of the Application Judge
 In April 2015, Burlington commenced the application now
under appeal seeking a mandatory order under the Municipal
Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s. 440, requiring Airpark to remove
all fill deposited since 2008 by November 30, 2015 or, in the
alternative, an order requiring Airpark to submit an application
under the 2014 by-law for all work performed since 2008.
 Airpark resisted the application on several grounds. Airpark argued that the by-law could not be applied retroactively,
that it was constitutionally inapplicable to its operations as Burlington had, in effect, enacted the by-law to specifically target
Airpark’s aeronautics operation, that the by-law was impermissibly vague, and that the application was out of time and barred
by the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B. Airpark
also contested Burlington’s evidence regarding the quality of the
fill it had deposited and relied on evidence that the fill and grading activities were related to airport safety.
 The application judge found that Airpark’s constitutional
argument was the same as the one it made unsuccessfully in
2013, and before this court in 2014, with respect to the earlier
by-law. He agreed with Murray J.’s finding that compliance with
the by-law would not impair the federal aeronautics power or
create an operational conflict, because the by-law’s substance
in this case was the regulation of alleged commercial landfill
activity on the site and not aeronautics activity. He further
found that Airpark was in fact operating a commercial landfill
business on the site and that not all the fill it deposited was
required for the purpose of airport modifications.
 The application judge rejected Airpark’s argument that
the by-law was impermissibly vague.
 The application judge did not specifically deal with the
retroactivity issue but held that Burlington’s application was not
barred by the Limitations Act and adopted Burlington’s submission that the proceedings it had commenced under the 2003
by-law were automatically continued by the Legislation Act,
2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch. F, s. 52, as if they had been taken
under the 2014 by-law.