it seems to me that the words “or permit the placing, dumping,
cutting or removal of fill” and “permit the alteration of the grade”
are aimed at the situation where an owner or occupant allows
someone else to dump fill or alter the grade. The intention, in my
view, is to make owners and occupiers responsible for all work
carried out on their lands, whoever actually performs the work,
and not to extend the application of the by-law to the entire history
of past dumping and grade alteration whenever it occurred.
(c) The applicability of the Legislation Act, 2006
 Before the application judge and before this court, Burlington contends that the proceedings it commenced under the
2003 by-law are continued by the Legislation Act, 2006, s. 52.
 Section 52(3) provides that, if an Act or regulation is
repealed, revoked, replaced or amended, “[p]roceedings commenced under the former Act or regulation shall be continued
under the new or amended one, in conformity with the new or
amended one as much as possible”.
 In my view, Burlington’s argument that s. 52(3) continues
the application of the 2003 by-law to Airpark is fatally flawed.
 The Legislation Act, 2006, by its terms, does not apply to
municipal by-laws. The Legislation Act, 2006 applies to “Acts
and regulations”. A municipal by-law is not an Act and the definition of “regulation” under the Legislation Act, 2006 specifically
excludes municipal by-laws. Section 87 defines “regulation” as
“a regulation that is filed under Part III (Regulations)”. In
Part III, s. 17(a) provides that “regulation” does not include
“a by-law of a municipality”. Section 49 extends the definition of
certain provisions of the Act to “every document that is made
under an Act but is not a regulation”. However, none of those
provisions assist Burlington in the context of this case.
 Burlington relies on ss. 46 and 47, the opening provisions
of Part VI of the Act dealing with interpretation, which is the
Part of the Act containing s. 52. Sections 46 and 47 provide:
46. Every provision of this Part applies to every Act and regulation.
47. Section 46 applies unless,
(a) a contrary intention appears; or
(b) its application would give to a term or provision a meaning that is
inconsistent with the context.
 Burlington argues that the context includes the benevolent
and broad purposive approach to the interpretation of municipal
by-laws reflected in Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver
(City),  1 S.C.R. 231,  S.C.J. No. 15. Burlington