contends that this context justifies reading s. 52 so that it applies
to by-laws. In my view, that submission misstates the effect of
ss. 46 and 47. Section 46 provides that Part VI applies to “every
Act and regulation”. The effect of s. 47, which states that s. 46
applies unless a contrary intention appears or the context
requires, can only be to restrict the application of s. 46 and Part
VI. I fail to see how s. 47 can be read as expanding the reach of
s. 46 to documents that are explicitly excluded from its reach.
 The second problem with Burlington’s argument is that,
even if s. 52(3) does apply to municipal by-laws, its effect is
merely to continue “proceedings commenced under the former
Act or regulation”. There is nothing in s. 52 that can be read as
continuing the substance of a repealed provision. I agree with
Airpark that there was no “proceeding” under the 2003 by-law
that is being continued in this proceeding. The application
before the application judge was a fresh proceeding asking for
relief under the 2014 by-law, not the 2003 by-law.
(2) Other issues
 As this appeal can be disposed of on the basis of the retroactivity argument, I find it unnecessary to consider the other
arguments advanced by Airpark.
 I recognize the public importance of enforcing standards
designed to protect the public from environmental harm. Our
task in this appeal, however, is limited to the determination of
the application of a specific by-law. In carrying out that task,
we must respect important principles of our legal order, one of
which is that, in the absence of clear legislative intention, to
interpret an enactment as “reaching into the past and declaring the law to be different from what it was is a serious violation of the rule of law” (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the
Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis,
2014), at para. 25.50; applied in St. Jean (Litigation guardian
of) v. Cheung (2008), 94 O.R. (3d) 359,  O.J. No. 4862,
2008 ONCA 815, at para. 39).
 For these reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the
order of the application judge and dismiss Burlington’s application with costs fixed in the amount agreed to by the parties,
$40,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes. If the parties are
unable to agree with respect to the costs of the application, they
may make brief written submissions.