because the trial judge failed to draw a distinction between prior
comments rejecting the evidence of the witness and prior findings of discreditable conduct, namely, the failure of Dr. Bail to
abide by his oath as an expert.
 I do not accept this argument. In my view, the prior com-
ments made about Dr. Bail do not amount to a finding of discred-
itable conduct. Rather, they are the opinions of a judge and two
arbitrators regarding the reliability of his testimony in particu-
lar cases. This is analogous to the situation in Ghorvei, where a
witness’ credibility had been attacked in previous proceedings.
Charron J.A. (as she then was) held, at para. 31, that those cred-
ibility findings from the previous proceedings were not proper
material for cross-examination:
In my view, it is not proper to cross-examine a witness on the fact that his
or her testimony has been rejected or disbelieved in a prior case. That fact,
in and of itself, does not constitute discreditable conduct. I do not think it
would be useful to allow cross-examination of a witness on what is, in
essence, no more than an opinion on the credibility of unrelated testimony
given by this witness in the context of another case. The triers of fact who
would witness this cross-examination would not be able to assess the value
of that opinion and the effect, if any, on the witness’s credibility without also
being provided with the factual foundation for the opinion.
See, also, R. v. Boyne,  S.J. No. 795, 2012 SKCA 124,
405 Sask. R. 163, at paras. 48-51, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused  S.C.C.A. No. 54.
 In the present case, the comments of the judge and arbitrators about Mr. Bail’s testimony in the previous cases would have
been of no assistance to the jury without an understanding of
their factual foundation. That necessary context would only have
served to divert the jury from the task at hand and convert
the trial into an inquiry regarding the reliability of Dr. Bail’s testimony in the three other proceedings. Thus, in my view, the trial
judge did not err in prohibiting this line of cross-examination.
(2) The trial judge’s gatekeeper role with respect to expert
(1) Qualification stage
 Ms. Bruff-McArthur submits that the trial judge should
have exercised his gatekeeper function to exclude Dr. Bail from
testifying on the grounds that his methodology was unfair; he
was biased; he was engaged in an exercise to destroy her credibility; and his prospective evidence would amount to a violation
of the rule in Browne v. Dunn. In the alternative, she argues
that the trial judge erred in not instructing the jury that they
should disregard Dr. Bail’s testimony.