fixture and an immovable fixture is whether the asset is capable
of being removed without causing material damage to the premises or the asset. The appellant contends that the structural
assets were not removable trade fixtures since they could not be
removed without material damage to the land.
 In what it advances as an alternative argument, the
appellant repeats its position that the structural assets could
not be removed without material damage to the lands, and
consequently, the trial judge should have found them to be
leasehold improvements that remain with the land at the end
of a tenancy.
 Furthermore, the appellant argues that a tenant must
remove its trade fixtures before the lease ends or before they
vacate the premises. Otherwise, the appellant submits a tenant
must be taken to have abandoned them.
 In a similar vein, the appellant submits that many of
the assets, such as the 35,000 golf balls, were not trade fixtures
at all but chattels. The respondent was aware of the lease
termination date and could have removed the chattels by that
date but chose to leave them. The appellant notes the respondent removed certain chattels, such as desks and chairs, by
December 6, 2007. This, in the appellant’s submission, supports the inference that the respondent abandoned the remaining chattels.
 Finally, with respect to damages, the appellant submits
that exemplary damages should only be awarded in exceptional
cases. The appellant argues that courts only award exemplary
damages where there is misconduct amounting to a marked
departure from ordinary standards of decent behaviour. Since
there was no such misconduct in the instant case, the appellant
contends the trial judge erred in law by awarding exemplary
E. The Respondent’s Position
 The respondent submits the trial judge applied the correct law of distress and that all of his findings deserve deference.
The respondent submits there is no palpable or overriding error
in the trial judge’s factual determination that the structural
assets could be removed without causing material damage. The
respondent recognizes that some of the assets in Schedule A
are chattels, but submits the appellant prevented it from removing them.
 Finally, the respondent argues that deference also applies
to this court’s review of the trial judge’s discretionary award of